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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 





ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
         Appellants, participants in two top hat pension plans, 
filed claims in bankruptcy court seeking benefits after their 
employer had been declared bankrupt and terminated the plans.  
The bankruptcy court dismissed their claims, relying on a clause 
in the plan documents that reserved the company's right to amend 
or terminate the plans "at any time for any reason."  The 
bankruptcy court found this language clear and unambiguous, and 
it refused appellants' proffer of extrinsic evidence to show that 
the clauses did not represent the original understanding of the 
parties.  The district court affirmed.  We will reverse and 
remand. 
         We conclude that the record in this case, viewed in the 
light of the special nature of top hat plans, distinguishes this 
case from prior decisions in which we have held a clause 
reserving the right to terminate or amend unambiguous and 
controlling.  See In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit 
"ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995); Hozier v. Midwest 
Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1163-64 (3d Cir. 1990).  
Therefore, we hold on the facts of this case that the bankruptcy 
court should have permitted the appellants to present extrinsic 
evidence in support of their allegations.  We will remand to the 
district court with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy 
court to conduct the necessary evidentiary hearing. 
                               I. 
         Appellants are former executives and highly paid 
personnel of Western Union Corporation ("Western Union") who 
participated in two top hat plans designed to provide deferred 
retirement income and other retirement benefits to a select group 
of employees.  As discussed more fully below, top hat plans 
represent a special category of benefit plans created under ERISA 
to provide these types of benefits to select employees.  After 
the employees had retired, Western Union's successor, New Valley 
Corporation ("New Valley"), terminated the plans.  Appellants 
responded with this action for benefits.  The facts are 
essentially undisputed. 
         In the mid-1970s, the first rumblings of technological 
revolution were felt in the communications industry.  Western 
Union had suffered financial reverses in the early part of the 
decade, and its Board of Directors ("Board") perceived a need to 
attract new executives to the company and to retain the key 
executives that it had.  The Board viewed an enhanced benefits 
and compensation package as the principal means to that end. 
         In early 1977, the Board began discussing a 
supplemental benefits package entitled the Senior Executive 
Benefit Plan ("SEBP" or "SEB Plan").  The SEB Plan would provide 
a select group of high-level employees with supplemental pension 
benefits, deferred compensation benefits, and supplemental 
medical benefits.  The plan was designed to achieve the 
previously identified goal of retaining Western Union's top 
management personnel and luring talented candidates to the 
company. 
         The initial draft of the plan was prepared by Gerald 
Kent, then Vice President-Employee Relations, in a form that 
substantially resembled the "SEBP Plan Summary" later distributed 
to the executives selected to participate.  This document 
described the plan benefits in some detail but made no mention of 
any reservation of the company's unilateral right to amend or 
terminate the plan.  Based on this summary, the Board approved 
the plan on August 23, 1977.  The Board's minutes similarly 
omitted any mention of a right to amend. 
         After the Board's action, Western Union distributed 
copies of the Plan Summary to potential participants.  As noted, 
the Plan Summary contained nothing indicating that Western Union 
reserved the right to amend or terminate the plan.  Western Union 
also held meetings with the participants to discuss the plan.  
Appellants allege that at these meetings they were informed that 
they would earn the promised benefits by continuing their 
employment with Western Union until retirement and that the 
benefits could not be taken away after retirement.  Throughout 
the initial stages of plan proposal, development, adoption, 
negotiation, and acceptance, no reservation of the right to amend 
or terminate existed. 
         Western Union's General Counsel, Richard C. Hostetler, 
drafted the formal plan.  The formal plan document, introduced 
five months later at a board meeting on February 28, 1978, 
included an article which reserved the right to amend or 
terminate the plan at any time.  The text of this article, 
Article 12, reads: 
         12.  Amendment and Termination.  The Board of 
         Directors may amend or terminate the Plan at 
         any time for any reason and thereafter 
         Participants and their estates and dependents 
         shall have only such rights under the Plan, 
         if any, as shall be specifically provided for 
         by the Board of Directors under the Plan as 
         amended or terminated. 
All subsequent versions of the plan contained this provision.  
However, none of the versions of the plan contained an 
integration clause. 
         Appellants are prepared to offer Mr. Hostetler's 
testimony that Article 12 was included in the SEBP formal 
document as "boiler plate" language that had been contained in 
all of Western Union's employee benefit plan documents.  Mr. 
Hostetler would also testify that at the Board meeting where 
Article 12 was discussed, the general understanding was that the 
provision could not be used to change or terminate benefits after 
retirement.  Appellants further allege that during a series of 
meetings held to discuss particular provisions in the Plan which 
might be of concern, Mr. Kent told them Article 12 could not be 
used to change or terminate their benefits after retirement.  
Appellants likewise contend that this understanding was conveyed 
to executives recruited by the company.  Accordingly, although 
the plans as adopted contained the termination "at any time" 
language, the appellant's understanding of that provision was 
informed by these representations. 
         In 1979, a separate plan was created for Walter E. 
Girardin ("Girardin Plan").  The motivation for the Girardin Plan 
was much the same as for the SEBP, to retain a key executive.  At 
the time, Western Union faced a potentially difficult transition 
from its long-standing Chairman and CEO, Russell McFall, to his 
successor, Robert M. Flanagan.  Girardin, who had worked for 
Western Union for more than 40 years, had been passed over for 
the CEO position.  When Girardin announced his decision to 
retire, the Board decided that he should be kept on for at least 
a year so that his skill and experience could help in the 
transition.  Western Union offered Girardin an enhanced benefits 
package to induce him to remain with the company.  After some 
negotiating, Girardin accepted.  Although the Girardin Plan was 
adopted separately and at a date later than the SEB Plan, its 
substantive provisions were identical.  It ultimately met the 
same fate as the SEBP.  Both plans will be discussed together. 
         After appellants had retired, New Valley terminated the 
plans, relying on Article 12 for its authority.  Appellants 
believe that, under the original agreement underlying the plan 
documents, such action was impermissible.  Appellants therefore 
contend that New Valley breached the SEBP and Girardin contracts.  
Alternatively, appellants urge that New Valley be estopped from 
terminating their benefits because of the promises Western Union 
made to the plan participants.  Appellants allege a variety of 
damages from the breach of contract, framed alternatively as 
detrimental reliance on Western Union's promise.  Their claims 
include leaving secure employment with other companies to join 
Western Union, declining employment offers from other companies 
to remain at Western Union, uprooting families and moving to New 
Jersey to become eligible for the SEBP, taking early retirement 
based on plan benefits, and declining to pursue other retirement 
options because of the plan. 
         The procedural history of this case began in the 
bankruptcy court.  At the time New Valley terminated the plans, 
its creditors had placed it in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Appellants 
therefore responded to the denial of benefits by filing proofs of 
claims in the bankruptcy proceeding, rather than by following the 
traditional course of a suit in district court for benefits under 
29 U.S.C.  1132(a).  In pursuing their claims, appellants argued 
that Article 12 had to be considered in the context in which it 
was created and that, when taken in that context, it was 
ambiguous.  They asked for a hearing in which they could support 
their claims with extrinsic evidence, including the testimony of 
Mr. Hostetler.  
         The bankruptcy court disallowed appellants' claims, 
relying principally on Article 12 of the plans.  The bankruptcy 
court described appellants' proposed construction of Article 12 
as plainly at variance with the terms in the plans.  In re New 
Valley Corp., Ch. 11 Case No. 91-27704, Oral Decision with 
respect to Omnibus Objection No. 5 at 7 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 8, 
1994) (hereinafter "Bankruptcy Court Opinion").  The court held 
that the plans had been validly terminated pursuant to Article 
12.  Id. 
         The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's 
decision, holding that the exemption of top hat plans from 
ERISA's writing requirement would not permit a departure from the 
plain meaning of Article 12, that Article 12 could not reasonably 
be interpreted to mean the plans vested at retirement, and that 
the bankruptcy court properly refused to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on the intent of the parties.  Senior Executive Benefit 
Plan Participants v. New Valley Corp. (In re New Valley Corp.), 
Adv. No. 94-2405, slip op. at 19-20 (D.N.J. January 18, 1995) 
(hereinafter "District Court Opinion").  This appeal followed. 
                              II. 
         The bankruptcy court heard this action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  157.  The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over the initial appeal under 28 U.S.C.  158(a).  This court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal from the district court pursuant to 
28 U.S.C.  158(d).  We exercise plenary review over the district 
court's determinations and over the bankruptcy court's 
conclusions of law.  We review the bankruptcy court's findings of 
fact for clear error.  Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman v. Charter 
Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1223 (3d Cir. 1995). 
                              III. 
         The principal issue before us is not whether the 
appellants can recover as a matter of law, but rather whether 
they can present evidence to establish that they bargained for a 
contractual set of benefits instead of a pension terminable at 
New Valley's whim any time after their retirement.  We hold that 
appellants should have the opportunity to clarify the meaning of 
their benefits contract through a proffer of extrinsic evidence.  
Their claims will then succeed or fail based on the evidence 
presented to the fact finder. 
                                A. 
         As a threshold matter, we have little difficulty 
concluding that ERISA provides the framework for our analysis.    
ERISA's coverage extends broadly to include all employee benefit 
plans.  See Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 
929 (3d Cir. 1985).  The SEB and Girardin Plans are clearly 
ERISA plans.  See 29 U.S.C.  1002(3) (defining "employee benefit 
plan"); Miller v. Eichleay Engineers, Inc., 886 F.2d 30, 33 n.7 
(3d Cir. 1989). 
         Finding ERISA applicable, however, is only an initial 
step.  The far more important determination is to locate the SEB 
and Girardin Plans within ERISA's landscape.  Both plans at issue 
are top hat plans, a fact that has crucial implications for this 
case.  "A top hat plan is a 'plan which is unfunded and is 
maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing 
deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly 
trained employees.'  29 U.S.C.  1051(2), 1081(a)(3), and 
1101(a)(1)."  Miller, 886 F.2d at 34 n.8; see also 29 U.S.C.  
1002(36), 1003(b).  The elements of this definition make the top 
hat category a narrow one.  Not only must the plan be unfunded 
and exhibit the required purpose, it must also cover a "select 
group" of employees.  This final limitation has both quantitative 
and qualitative restrictions.  In number, the plan must cover 
relatively few employees.  In character, the plan must cover only 
high level employees.  Because of these limitations, top hat 
plans form a rare sub-species of ERISA plans, and Congress 
created a special regime to cover them. 
         The dominant characteristic of the special top hat 
regime is the near-complete exemption of top hat plans from 
ERISA's substantive requirements.  Section 1051(2) exempts top 
hat plans from ERISA's minimum participation standards, minimum 
vesting standards, and various other content requirements.  
Section 1081(a)(3) exempts top hat plans from ERISA's minimum 
funding requirements.  Section 1101(a)(1) exempts top hat plans 
from ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions, including the 
requirement of a written plan, the need to give control of plan 
funds to a trustee, the imposition of liability on fiduciaries, 
and limitations on transactions and investments.  Section 
1051(2) exempts top hat plans from ERISA's reporting and 
disclosure requirements upon promulgation of the proper 
administrative regulations.  These regulations are in place.  29 
C.F.R.  2520.104-23 (1995) (establishing minimal alternative 
reporting requirements for top hat plans); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 
F.2d 631, 637 (3d Cir. 1989); see generally Barrowclough, 752 
F.2d at 930-31.  As a result, top hat plans are covered only by 
ERISA's enforcement provisions.  Kemmerer v. ICI Americas, Inc., 
70 F.3d 281, 286-87 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
64 U.S.L.W. 3776, 64 U.S.L.W. 3778 (May 20, 1996); Barrowclough, 
752 F.2d at 931, 935, 937. 
         Although all of these provisions are important in 
defining the top hat category, one specific exemption from this 
list has particular importance for the current dispute:  top hat 
plans are excluded from ERISA's writing requirement.  Other ERISA 
plans, by contrast, are governed by a stringent writing 
requirement:  "Every employee benefit plan shall be established 
and maintained pursuant to a written instrument."  29 U.S.C.  
1102(a)(1).  This provision has formed the cornerstone of a 
series of decisions by this and other courts limiting litigants 
to the language of the plan document.  See Hozier v. Midwest 
Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1163-64 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
cases).  Under this interpretation,  1102(a)(1) essentially 
operates as a strong integration clause, statutorily inserted in 
every plan document covered by the fiduciary duty provisions.  
Like any common law integration clause,  1102(a)(1) makes the 
plan document the entire agreement of the parties and bars the 
introduction of parol evidence to vary or contradict the written 
terms.  See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 
F.2d 1001, 1010 n.9 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing integration 
clauses and parol evidence rule). 
         Top hat plans are exempt from  1102(a)(1).  As a 
result, top hat agreements can be partially or exclusively oral.  
They may, of course, be integrated by their own terms, just as 
they may contain any provision to which the parties agree.  They 
do not, however, gain the benefit of statutory additions such as 
 1102(a)(1).  Consequently, Hozier and other cases which limit 
employees strictly to the terms of the plan document are 
inapposite.  Top hat plans are instead governed by general 
principles of federal common law.  Barrowclough, 752 F.2d at 936.  
Here, that law is the federal common law of contract. 
         Both parties agree that the plans in question are top 
hat plans.  Both the SEB Plan and the Girardin Plan therefore 
exist in the unique top hat category of ERISA coverage and 
exemption.  They are exempt from the writing requirement of  
1102(a)(1), and federal common law developed under the aegis of 
ERISA governs their enforcement. 
         Applying the federal common law of contract, we believe 
that the bankruptcy court erred in construing the plan documents.  
A court cannot interpret words in a vacuum, but rather must 
carefully consider the parties' context and the other provisions 
in the plan.  Moreover, extrinsic evidence should have been 
considered to determine whether an ambiguity existed, especially 
in the absence of an integration clause in the plan. 
         Whether a document is ambiguous presents a question of 
law properly resolved by this court.  Stendardo v. Federal Nat'l 
Mortgage Ass'n, 991 F.2d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1993).  Our 
precedents clearly establish the steps involved in resolving a 
contractual ambiguity. 
         To decide whether a contract is ambiguous, we 
         do not simply determine whether, from our 
         point of view, the language is clear.  
         Rather, we "hear the proffer of the parties 
         and determine if there [are] objective 
         indicia that, from the linguistic reference 
         point of the parties, the terms of the 
         contract are susceptible of different 
         meanings."  Sheet Metal Workers, 949 F.2d at 
         1284 (brackets in original) (quoting Mellon 
         Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 
         619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir.1980)).  Before 
         making a finding concerning the existence or 
         absence of ambiguity, we consider the 
         contract language, the meanings suggested by 
         counsel, and the extrinsic evidence offered 
         in support of each interpretation.  Id.;  
         Mack Trucks, 917 F.2d at 111; see alsoRestatement (Second) of 
Contracts  223 cmt. 
         b (1981) ("There is no requirement that an 
         agreement be ambiguous before evidence of a 
         course of dealing can be shown . . ..").  
         Extrinsic evidence may include the structure 
         of the contract, the bargaining history, and 
         the conduct of the parties that reflects 
         their understanding of the contract's 
         meaning. 
Teamsters Indus. Employees Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor 
Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993).  And once a 
contract provision is found to be  ambiguous, extrinsic evidence 
must be considered to clarify its meaning.  See Hullett v. 
Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 
1994); Taylor v. Continental Group Change in Control Severance 
Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1991). 
         Neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court 
followed these steps.  Both instead adopted, and then misapplied, 
a "four corners" approach to the contract.  Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d 
at 1011 ("Under a 'four corners' approach a judge sits in 
chambers and determines from his point of view whether the 
written words before him are ambiguous.").  Since Mellon Bank, 
however, this court has required the judge to hear the proffer of 
the parties and consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether 
there is an ambiguity, and then to resolve or clarify any 
ambiguity that may exist. 
                                B. 
         Our interpretation of the SEB and Girardin top hat 
plans is assisted by our recent decision in Kemmerer v. ICI 
Americas, Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 286-87 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 3776, 64 U.S.L.W. 3778 (May 20, 1996). 
The unilateral contract theory in Kemmerer supports appellants' 
explication of the plans as a whole and of Article 12 in 
particular. 
         In Kemmerer, we interpreted a top hat plan that 
permitted plan participants to elect a payment schedule by which 
they would receive their benefits.  The plaintiffs elected an 
extended payment schedule and later retired.  The company then 
unilaterally terminated the plan, paying the remaining amounts 
due the participants in three annual installments.  70 F.3d at 
285.  The participants sued, the district court found a breach, 
and we affirmed. 
         After concluding that top hat plans were subject to 
ERISA, we turned to contract principles to resolve the dispute.  
Id. at 287.  Examining the contract as a whole, we found a 
unilateral contract which created vested rights in those 
employees who accepted the offer it contained by continuing in 
the company's employment until retirement.  Id.  "Under 
unilateral contract principles, once the employee performs, the 
offer becomes irrevocable, the contract is completed, and the 
employer is required to comply with its side of the bargain."  
Id.  In response to ICI's argument that the contract did not 
restrict its right to terminate the plan, we observed,  
         even when a plan reserves to the sponsor an 
         explicit right to terminate the plan, 
         acceptance by performance closes that door 
         under unilateral contract principles (unless 
         an explicit right to terminate or amend after 
         the participants performance is reserved).  
         "Any other interpretation . . . would make 
         the Plan's several specific and mandatory 
         provisions ineffective, rendering the 
         promises embodied therein completely 
         illusory." 
Id. at 287-88 (emphasis added) (quoting Carr v. First Nationwide 
Bank, 816 F.Supp. 1476 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).  In our view, the 
company's claim to an unfettered right to terminate in the face 
of specific grants of benefits "ha[d] no basis in contract law" 
and was "more than minimally unfair."  Id. at 287. 
         Like the payout system set forth in Kemmerer, the post- 
retirement benefits of the New Valley plan can be construed as 
creating a unilateral contract offer that the employees accepted 
by working faithfully until retirement, at which time the 
benefits would vest.  Thus, the plan may not be terminated unless 
an explicit right "to terminate . . . after the participant's 
performance is reserved."  Kemmerer, 70 F.3d at 287-88. 
         In the current case, the plan documents do contain 
language that could be interpreted as reserving a right for New 
Valley to terminate even after retirement: the plan says it can 
be terminated "at any time."  As a matter of plain language, New 
Valley contends, this phrase is unambiguous.  But this is not 
necessarily so.  A common example shows that the meaning of "at 
any time" depends on the context.  Suppose an employer and 
employee enter into a contract stating that employee will work 
forty hours per week for $500, payable at the end of the week.  
The contract further states that employment is at will and 
employer can change employee's wages "at any time."  After 
working a week, employee goes to pick up her pay check.  Employer 
informs employee that it has exercised its right to change her 
wages "at any time," and will be paying her $300 for that week's 
work.  Despite the seemingly unambiguous "at any time" language, 
it seems reasonable that an employee would not expect the 
reduction in salary to take place post-performance.  Although 
this is not our situation, it makes clear that the words "at any 
time" may admit of more than one reasonable interpretation.  
         The appropriate question, then, is whether "at any 
time" is unambiguous in this context.  The benefits at issue in 
this case, like the wages in our hypothetical case, are payable 
entirely after performance.  As in the wage scenario, agreeing to 
allow New Valley to terminate the benefits even after retirement 
would make this "contract" largely illusory.  Although parties 
are free to enter into illusory agreements, the unlikelihood that 
they will do so when significant benefits are at stake may render 
a term ambiguous.  In this context, the unlikelihood that the 
Appellants agreed to allow New Valley to terminate their 
retirement benefits at its whim, coupled with Appellants' 
reasonable alternative interpretation of "at any time" (until 
performance), supports the argument that the term is ambiguous.  
If New Valley desired to clearly indicate its ability to 
terminate benefits even after performance, in the face of likely 
expectations to the contrary, it could have simply added the 
words "including after retirement" to the plan. 
         Moreover, in the current case, as in Kemmerer, other 
provisions in the plan point to a binding contractual agreement.  
For example, the plan documents contain several "specific and 
mandatory provisions" promising what appear to be benefits which 
vest on retirement.  These provisions include Article 4, Deferred 
Compensation Benefit; Article 5, Supplemental Disability Benefit; 
and Article 6, Supplemental Medical Benefits.  The language 
quoted here is taken from the original 1977 plan. 
         Article 4 states:  "A deferred compensation benefit 
will be paid upon the death of any Participant after retirement 
on pension . . . ."  Article 5 states:  "Any Participant entitled 
to receive [basic benefits] whose Total Service at the date of 
disability exceeds five years, will receive . . . a supplemental 
disability benefit . . . ."  Article 6 states:  "(a)  Following 
termination of active employment on account of disability, a 
Participant may obtain supplemental medical benefits . . . .  (b)  
In the event of death . . ., the dependents of that Participant 
may obtain medical benefits . . . .  (c)  Dental benefits will be 
provided at no cost to [qualified participants]."  App. at 33-34 
(emphasis added).  The mandatory language of these provisions 
denotes benefits that will be provided by the company once the 
participant retires, i.e., benefits that vest at retirement. 
         Other provisions provide less definite support for 
vested benefits.  Article 3 states the requirements for a 
participant to receive a supplemental benefit.  These 
requirements include participation in the Basic Contributory Plan 
during employment, followed by retirement and receipt of a 
pension under the Basic plan.  Article 3 also states the method 
for calculating the supplemental pension.  This provision implies 
that a pension calculated in this manner will be given to those 
participants who satisfy these requirements. 
         Article 10, Suspension of Benefits, also provides 
indirect support for vesting at retirement.  This article makes 
no mention of post-retirement actions that could result in 
termination of benefits.  It discusses only "engag[ing] in any 
activity or conduct which, in the judgment of the Committee, is 
prejudicial to the best interests of the Corporation or its 
subsidiaries."  Id. at 34.  While this omission is not 
conclusive, it is consistent with a pension that vests on 
retirement. 
         "An ambiguous contract is one capable of being 
understood in more senses than one . . ..  Before it can be said 
that no ambiguity exists, it must be concluded that the 
questioned words or language are capable of [only] one 
interpretation."  American Flint Glass Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. 
Beaumont Glass Co., 62 F.3d 574, 581 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Landtect Corp. v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 605 F.2d 75, 80 (3d 
Cir. 1979)).  Based on the two interpretations offered by the 
parties, we cannot say that here.  By numerous indicia -- (1) 
that the words "at any time" are inconclusive; (2) that the right 
to terminate even after retirement would render the provisions 
for benefits largely illusory; and (3) that the plan contains 
numerous specific and mandatory provisions -- the contract 
language appears ambiguous.  These factors, coupled with the oral 
representations made by New Valley to the plaintiffs (that the 
plan did not permit termination after retirement) and the fact 
that we are dealing with an unintegrated top hat plan, convinces 
us that an ambiguity exists as to whether there was a right to 
terminate after retirement (or only before).  Our opinion is thus 
a narrow one, informed by this concatenation of factors.  
Construing the plan document "as a whole," see Alexander v. 
Primerica Holdings, Inc., 967 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1992), we find 
appellants understanding of Article 12 at least equally plausible 
as New Valley's interpretation. 
         Because appellants have demonstrated ambiguity in the 
plan, the bankruptcy court should have permitted appellants to 
present extrinsic evidence to clarify its meaning.  See Hullett 
v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 38 F.2d 107, 111 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Taylor v. Continental Group Change in Control 
Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1991).  Evidence 
of the parties' intent, such as that proffered by appellants, is 
directly relevant to this issue.  Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 
6. F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[t]o choose between these 
competing meanings, we can consider extrinsic evidence of the 
parties' understanding of that term"); see also Taylor, 933 F.3d 
at 1233 (noting "the reasonable understanding of the 
beneficiaries, as well as the intent of the employer, may be 
admissible to clarify ambiguities [in an ERISA plan term]").  
                                C. 
         The bankruptcy court should also consider appellants' 
promissory estoppel claims in light of their proffered extrinsic 
evidence.  We have recognized the viability of estoppel claims 
against ERISA plans in general, see Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant 
Employees and Bartenders Union, 637 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981), and against top hat plans in 
particular, Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d at 630. 
         To establish a claim for equitable estoppel under 
ERISA, a plaintiff must prove:  (1) a material representation, 
(2) reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the representation, 
and (3) extraordinary circumstances.  Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 1994).  In the context 
of this case, the first two elements are particularly germane.  
Because top hat plans can be partially or exclusively oral, top 
hat participants may reasonably rely on oral representations of 
benefits, even in the face of a termination clause like Article 
12.  
         On remand, the bankruptcy court should address these 
issues.  Analysis of appellants' estoppel claims will necessarily 
be affected by the interpretation given Article 12.  
                                D. 
         In reaching these conclusions, we are well aware of our 
decision in In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" 
Litig., 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995), which reached a different 
conclusion about the validity of a similar termination clause in 
the context of a different type of ERISA plan.  We do not believe 
that Unisys can control the uniquely narrow category of top hat 
benefit plans on these different facts. 
         First, unlike the welfare benefits at issue in Unisys, 
top hat plans are exempt from ERISA's writing requirement, 29 
U.S.C.  1102(a)(1).  The rationale behind this distinction seems 
straight-forward.  The potentially expansive size and scope of 
welfare benefit plans makes a writing requirement necessary as a 
practical matter of plan administration.  Our decision in Unisys, 
for example, addressed a large scale employee welfare plan that 
provided a variety of benefits to approximately 21,000 employees 
at all levels.  58 F.3d at 899 n.4.  Top hat plans, by contrast, 
cover narrow groups of select individuals.  Because of the 
limited number of employees involved and their place in the 
organizational hierarchy, top hat plans can be exempted from the 
writing requirement without inviting administrative difficulties. 
         In terms of distinguishing Unisys, the exemption of top 
hat plans has importance beyond this practical rationale.  As 
noted, supra, the writing requirement has formed the basis of a 
series of cases limiting employee-litigants to the language of 
plan documents.  See Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 
1155, 1163-64 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing cases).  The provision 
buttressed our decision in Unisys, where we noted that 
         ERISA's framework ensures that employee 
         benefit plans be governed by written 
         documents and summary plan descriptions, 
         which are the statutorily established means 
         of informing participants and beneficiaries 
         of the terms of their plan and its benefits.  
         See, e.g., Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 
         [908 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir. 1990)], Confer 
         v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 41 (3d 
         Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 938 
         (1992); Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 
         F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 
         U.S. 938 (1992); 29 U.S.C.  1022(a)(1).  
         Accordingly, any retiree's right to lifetime 
         medical benefits under a plan can only be 
         found if it is established by the terms of 
         the plan documents. 
58 F.3d at 902.  We later explained that under this provision, 
"the written terms of the plan documents control and cannot be 
modified or superseded by the employer's oral undertakings."  Id. 
In the context of top hat plans, however, Unisys's statements are 
simply not true.  The writing requirement does not apply.  Unisysis not 
controlling. 
         Second, the exemption of top hat plans from ERISA's 
fiduciary provisions creates an important difference from Unisysin terms 
of the remedy available.  Top hat employees have rights 
only under the contract.  Where a contract action fails, they 
have no recourse.  Welfare benefit plan participants, by 
contrast, enjoy an action for breach of fiduciary duty.  We held 
in In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 
F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 
1316 (1996), that welfare plan participants retained a cause of 
action for breach of fiduciary duty, despite the same general 
right to terminate or amend held fatal to the participants' 
contractual claim in the related Unisys case discussed here, 58 
F.3d 896.  Top hat participants have no such alternative remedy.  
They must seek their remedy in contract law.  Contractual 
provisions must therefore be enforced with care. 
         Third, the very different nature of the benefits at 
issue in Unisys distinguishes that case from this.  In Unisys, 
employees participated in an unfunded welfare benefit plan that 
promised ongoing medical benefits "for life."  The benefits were 
payable as compensation while the employees worked and then 
continued on into retirement.  After the participants retired, 
the company terminated the plan, relying on a general reservation 
of the right to modify or terminate "at any time" and "for any 
reason."  The district court held the reservation of the right to 
terminate clear and unambiguous.  It therefore rejected the 
participants' breach of contract and equitable estoppel claims 
and entered summary judgment for the employer.  Id. at 898.  We 
affirmed. 
         Although the language of the termination clause in 
Unisys was similar to the clause here, syntax is not 
determinative.  This case involves benefits that are not payable, 
at all, until after retirement.  In contrast to the benefits in 
Unisys, which were ongoing medical benefits available during 
working years and continuing into retirement, the benefits here 
became available only upon retirement.  As we have noted, 
agreeing to terms allowing these benefits to be terminated even 
after retirement would make the "agreement" illusory.  Thus, 
because interpreting the words "at any time" to include "after 
retirement" seems less reasonable in this context, the words are 
more likely to be ambiguous in this case. 
         These distinctions (and the others noted above) show 
the important differences between the plans examined here and 
those examined in Unisys.  In addition, we note that our decision 
in Unisys recognized its own limitations. 
         We do not hold that a reservation of rights 
         will always prevail over a promise of 
         benefits.  Due to the abundance of ERISA plan 
         and the differing benefits these plans 
         provide, each case must be considered fact 
         specific and the court must make its 
         determination of the benefits provided based 
         on the language of the particular plan it has 
         been called upon to review. 
Id. at 904 n.11.  We merely add to this general caution a caveat 
about the type of plan that the court must review.  Here, in the 
context of a top hat plan, Unisys's holding does not apply. 
                               IV. 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of 
the district court and remand the matter with direction to vacate 
the order of the bankruptcy court and further remand to the 
bankruptcy court to hear appellants proffered evidence on the 
meaning of Article 12. We intimate no belief as to the ultimate 
meaning of Article 12, nor the eventual success of appellant's 
claims.  
 
 
